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ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Tel. 208-762-4545 
Fax 208-762-4546 
ISB#2312 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARIAN B. BAKEER, TRUSTEE OF ) 
THE MARIAN B. BAKER TRUST, ) 
Dated May 12, 2013, ) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KAL, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability ) 
Company, ) 
Defendant/Counterclaimants/ ) 
Cross Claimants/Appellants, ) 
~d ) 
) 
JOHN STADLER and VICKIE ) 
ST ADLER, husband and wife, ) 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/ ) 
Cross Claimants/ Appellants, ) 
and ) 
) 
JOSEI.MELENDRERASand ) 
JACQUELINE Z. MELENDRERAS, ) 
Husband and wife, ) 
Defendants/Cross Defendants/ ) 
Respondents. ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 44855 
DC NO. CV-15-1484 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Comes now KAL,LLC, the Defendant/Appellant in the above matter, by and 
through its attorney, Robert Covington, to submit its reply brief. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The issues presented in this appeal are simple. The errors of the trial court are 
plain. The brief filed by the Respondent, hereinafter "Baker," reiterates the rationale 
offered by the trial court, avoids clear and relevant precedent and argues for an unjust 
result. The Appellant, hereinafter KAL, urges the Court to reverse the decision of the 
trial court, determine that the deed in question is unambiguous and does not grant to 
Baker's predecessor in interest an express easement for ingress and egress over that 
portion of Alexana Lane that traverses KAL's parcel, Tract 9, and remand this matter 
for further proceedings. 
A. THE DEED IS UNAMBIGUOUS 
In its initial brief in this appeal, KAL cited the Court to recent and compelling 
precedent on the issue of determining whether a deed is ambiguous. Camp Easton 
Forever, Inc. v. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts of America, 156 Idaho 893, 332 
P.3d 805 (2014). The Court there held that a deed is ambiguous when it is reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. at p. 900. Neither the trial court nor Baker 
has applied this test within this proceeding. When the Camp Easton test is applied to 
the deed that is in question in this matter, the decision must be that the deed is 
unambiguous. 
As pointed out on page 7 of Appellant's Brief, the trial court said that a literal 
reading of the word "reserving" created an "absurdity" in that Timberland was 
reserving to itself an easement through land it already owned. T. June 29, 2016, p. 13, l. 
22. Baker makes the same argument as the trial court. Both are incorrect in that the 
use of the word reserving in the Timberland deed never purports to reserve an 
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easement over land it would own after the completion of the transaction with 
Melendreras. 
Baker points to use of the word reserving in reference to Parcel 1 of the 
conveyance to Melendreras wherein Timberland reserved therefrom "that portion" of 
the road that is described in Exhibit B that crossed Parcel 1. Baker ignores the "that 
portion" of the reservation to argue that the reservation applied to the whole of the 
road described in Exhibit B. Baker argues that since you cannot reserve an easement 
across your own property, "reserving" is ambiguous in the Timberland deed. The 
Court can no doubt plainly understand that the "that portion" modifier of reserving 
literally means that the reservation did not apply to the whole of the road described in 
Exhibit B. It should be noted that reserving is used a second time in the Parcel 1 
conveyance/description in a manner consistent with the initial use. No second 
reasonable interpretation of the meaning of reserving is offered by Baker or the trial 
court with respect to two instances in Parcel 1. For that matter, there is no "absurdity" 
in either reservation. 
Reserving is used once in reference to Parcel 2 of the Timberland conveyance to 
Melendreras. In that instance Timberland reserved an easement over a strip of land 
sixty feet in width paralleling the north boundary of Parcel 2. Neither did the trial 
court reason nor Baker argue that that use of "reserving" has multiple reasonable 
interpretations in this instance. KAL submits that the trial court may have misread the 
"TOGETHER WITH" paragraph referencing Parcel 2 to conclude that Timberland 
was granting to itself an easement over land it continued to own after the Melendreras 
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transaction. That language plainly grants to Melendreras an easement over a portion 
of Tract 9. Baker acknowledges as much in its brief at page 15 thereof. 
B. ERROR TO CREATE NEW EASEMENT NOT WITHIN MEANING OF 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEED 
In the absence of multiple conflicting reasonable interpretations, the 
Timberland to Melendreras deed must be held to be unambiguous. Because the deed is 
unambiguous, it was further error for the trial court to look outside the deed to render 
its judgment regarding the intent of the parties and then create a new easement for 
Melendreras. 
However, if the deed is unambiguous, the merger doctrine applies. The merger 
doctrine merges a prior contract into a deed when the deed is delivered and 
accepted as performance of conveyance contract. Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 
Idaho 373,382,414 P.2d 879,884 (1966). Even when a deed's terms vary from 
an earlier contract, courts must look to the deed alone to determine parties' 
rights. Id. Thus, an unambiguous deed forecloses considering another 
agreement, including the Minutes. Accordingly, this case comes down to one 
question, whether the deed is ambiguous. 
Camp Easton at page 899. After considering oral extrinsic evidence the trial court 
concluded that "Timberland intended to grant an easement to Melendreras to cross 
Tracts 5,6,11, 10 and 9 all the way into Tract 8 and in the same document to reserve 
itself-to itself an easement to cross Sections 7 and 8 that it had just sold to the 
Melendrerases. Therefore, this Court finds specific that Melendrerases specifically and 
expressly granted to plaintiff the easement rights that it had received from 
Timberlake--Timberland. I keep saying Timberlake; it's Timberland." T. June 29, 
2016, p. 8, II. 3-12. By granting to Baker an easement across Tract 9, the trial court 
did not select from one of multiple reasonable interpretations of the language of the 
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deed as required by Camp Easton. Rather, the trial court inserted a new term into the 
1999 Timberland to Melendreras deed. No reasonable person looking at the 1999 
Timberland to Melendreras deed could find in the language any reasonable 
interpretation that created an easement for Melendreras along the road across Tracts 9 
and 10. In essence, the trial court modified the Timberland/Melendreras 1999 deed by 
inserting a new term long after the statute of limitations had run on any claim by 
Melendreras against Timberland for breach of contract. The creation of such an 
easement by the trial court was erroneous and should be reversed. 
C. NO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL TO BAKER 
Baker has asserted a claim for attorney fees on appeal on the false premises that 
there was no proper appeal and that KAL has no right to present argument on the 
ambiguity of the deed in question to the Court. The initial issue was resolved 
previously by the Court and the appeal reinstated. As to the second issue, the Court 
exercises free review of the question of law that is at the heart of this matter. Baker 
claims that no authority nor analysis of the ambiguity issue has been presented to this 
Court. That is simply false and absurd. Camp Easton is significant authority in 
support of the contentions of KAL. That Baker has ignored Camp Easton is incredible. 
No attorney fees as sought by Baker should be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a classic example of claims that raise the public policy 
considerations underlying the Statute of Frauds, the prohibition of extrinsic evidence 
when contracts or deeds are clear and unambiguous on their face and statutes of 
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limitations. The principal events in this case occurred seventeen years ago. Jerry 
Mortensen, the person who signed the Timberland deed is dead. More than five years 
have elapsed since 1999 and with the passage of time, the right of Melendreras to assert 
against Timberland or Mortensen that Timberland failed to deliver an easement 
allegedly promised in 1999. The record in this case contains no writing other than the 
deed that was signed by Timberland. Melendreras claimed that their lender required 
the easement they seek in this case but there is no corroborating evidence and the deed 
itself plainly does not contain such a grant. KAL bought its property in 2002. The 
recorded Timberland deed to Melendreras contains no notice to KAL of an express 
easement in favor of Melendreras over the logging road as it existed in 2002. 
Whether the facts and our law support an easement implied from prior use or a 
statutory easement in this case is not known as those issues have not been fully tried. 
The Timberland deed does make it clear that there should be no express easement such 
as created by the trial court. The trial court's decision on ambiguity should be 
reversed, the deed determined to be unambiguous and interpreted to say that there is 
no express easement in favor of Baker over those portions of the road in Tract 9 that 
are described in Exhibit B to the deed. The case should then be remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
Dated this 23rd day of October, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of October, 2017, I caused to be 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facsimile 
transmission to: 
William A. Fuhrman 
Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, Gourley 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: 208-331-1529 
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